In Pakistan, depending on your place of residing, there is no electricity from six to twenty hours a day. Whereas it has hit hard the lives of the common man, making it impossible to function on a day to day basis, it has also brought down production in industrial sectors drastically, costing contracts and jobs of millions across the country.

If we look at the issue- two reasons emerge. First the demand is far greater than the supply. Pakistan is just not producing enough of it to go around. Second, the government is failing in paying dues to power generation companies thus giving rise to the phenomenon of “circular debt.” This is basically piling up of government dues outstanding to the power supplying units thereby disabling them from covering their overheads and producing /importing power. Once this debt is paid off, the IPP’s can pay off their petroleum import expenses and start producing at optimum levels. The IPP’s at current are responsible to provide electricity to half of our country. As the Govt. did not pay their debt so now they are charging or demanding higher per unit prices from the consumers. This hike in electricity prices is affecting not only our local industries and homes but is also affecting our exports of manufacturing goods. The govt. must intervene and pay out the circular debt. Or provide subsidy on electricity.

Most of the systems here run on either Gas or Coal i-e they are thermal systems. Both Gas and Coal are considered as scarce and expensive commodities for electricity producers. We lack high quality lower end grids that are used to carry electricity from power houses to the ultimate consumers via grid stations. The infrastructure is old and deteriorated. The system is unable to sustain extreme weather conditions hence most of the grids shut down at extreme temperature or either completely stops working. WAPDA is facing huge line losses due to electricity theft or illegal usage of electricity.

Then also, we face the very real problem of foreign investor being shy to invest big bucks in Pakistan owing to the socio-political-corrupt system.

There will be no honeymoon period for the Nawaz Sharif Government. The test of his government will be to provide immediate relief to the people. Nawaz Sharif needs to put together some sharp plans to address this pressing issue. Short term ones must be married to long term goals.

Some short term steps to address the situation are: Line Losses & reasons must be look into & steps taken to correct the same, Incoming government MUST look into discrimination of electricity distribution. Why is Punjab (more particularly) and in particular Lahore, Faisalabad & some other cities facing power outrages for 16  hours a day? Whereas this is reportedly not happening to this degree in other provinces. Upgrade Grid Stations, govt. must convert inefficient gas plants to efficient ones in order to conserve electric energy. In areas where over 80% of bills are being paid must not suffer power outrages as sharply as in areas where they are not. This will not only encourage timely payment of bills but will also be seen as being in the spirit of fairness.

Long term solution requires focused attention. Pakistan cannot sustain flawed judgment in taking of a final decision in this regard. It is exorbitantly expense neigh impossible to convert present energy giving units into one with different source of energy production. It will require virtual revamping of the entire existing set ups. However, Govt should look into the possibility of setting up Energy Units with LNG. I am told this is cheaper in terms of setting up & operational costs. LNG is cheap (comparatively).Very cheap. Qatar is the biggest producer/exporter for LNG. Qatar can export gas in liquefied form anywhere in the world and focus on the places where the state earns the most income for the gas. The idea at first was to ship LNG by boat to the US, which was supposed to help meet the demand of hungry Americans, but the continuously low natural gas prices in the US mean that it is more profitable for Qatar to supply its gas elsewhere, e.g. the United Kingdom, India, Japan and other countries in south-eastern Asia and Europe. Demand for Qatar’s liquid gas increased immediately in Japan after the earthquake on March 18 – supplying gas over such a distance through a system of pipelines would be practically impossible, especially when there is more than just dry land between the two locations. In addition to these distant places, some neighbors of Qatar have also shown an interest in buying gas from the country, especially Bahrain, Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Four of the six GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates – are importers of natural gas and only two are exporters – Qatar and Oman. As the gas exports of Oman are ca 10% of the gas exports of Qatar, there is no doubt that Qatar is the most influential supplier of natural gas in the region. There is no reason to fear that Qatar will run out of gas any time soon. The country has the third-largest natural gas deposits after Iran and Russia – Qatar owns 14% of the total gas reserves of the world. Qatar has enough gas for more than 200 years at current production quantities.

The incursion of foreign investment will depend on a conducive atmosphere directly linked to political & social stability of the country. Corruption must be checked to encourage it-with incentives.

Nawaz Sharif will be well advised to review and down size the massive increase of Rs 5.82 per unit price of electricity by the caretaker government. This step is being termed as facilitation for incoming dispensation. In a situation where due to unavailability of gas & electricity the business community is struggling to do business, common man struggling to manage expenses, the step is seen in direction of lowering Nawaz Sharif government popularity even before being sworn to office!

The writer is a lawyer & Author of a Media Book .Her twitter handle is @yasmeen_9

For democracy to succeed in Pakistan, we have to evolve our own form of democracy. That cannot be achieved by an imitation of the Westminster type of democracy. It must suit the social life and the national spirit of the Pakistani people. It must fit into its national structure. Otherwise, as has been seen during the last 60 years or so, it has brought more harm than good for the country. To create and make a Constitution one has to study the psychology and sociology of a nation.

Our people are still in a slumber. The question arises can ‘sleeping’ people understand the value of freedom? People will wake up only when they are aware of their own aims and goals. So far, we have been led by a band of dynastic rulers. The present form of democracy, as being run in our country, is along the lines of the English system. Such democracy has always been supported by the crown. The strength of the British crown has been the navy and the land forces, the air force came later. The queen-empress or the king-emperor heads the forces. The aura added stability to this type of democracy.

In our part of the world, on the other hand, the leaders for quite some time till now are progenies of the former collaborators, whom the British had made into nawabs, tumandars, and chiefs. They may not be in the front but the people’s power from the rural areas is still with them. The then world power in which the sun never set, the rule of the union jack had created a new set of rulers for us after the fall of what is now called Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and the Northern Areas.

Men who had provided ‘services’ to the crown were awarded titles and positions in our society that still linger on in one form or the other. The British had created them in wake of their forward policies but the British had left our land 60 years ago. Do we need them now? Why do we still adhere to them? Why no government of the past has touched them. This is a major factor. Men like Iskandar Mirza boasted of their links with Mir Jaffar of Bengal. None challenged him. What our nation desperately needs is an in-take of fresh blood in our political system.

The condition of graduation as the minimum standard of education did put an end to the practice of illiterate people becoming MNAs and MPAs. They ensured their presence by throwing in their new breed of graduates. The only difference is that they now speak English in American accent. This, in a way, shows the state of our political bankruptcy. The elders still play the thana-katchehry politics. It is also a fact that those in power are bullied by those in the opposition, whose main target is to attain power by fair or foul means regardless of the harm they do to the national interest or cause. Sometimes the opposition succeeds in turning the tables on the rulers in power and the role is merely reversed when the opposition comes to power.

Mudslinging continues and the benefit is reaped while the sun shines. They bask in its glory. Therefore, an insight in any level of leadership is a must. It is the duty of the state to be able to ensure that. Hardly any political party can claim a vote bank, except for the religious parties. But that is a different story. Our blood hounds sniff the air, the political air, before they join the fray. They maintain the legacy of their past masters to ensure that disharmony and a state of uncertainty should always prevail. Changing the bandwagons is a matter of a whim. Today we have the PPP, yesterday it was PML (Q). Before that, it was the ever-loyal PML (N). So, where is the vote bank?

Remember, here the object is not a national cause. Here the true chameleon has to recoup his election costs, and the payment he made to the party funds for getting a ticket. Unfortunately, our writers make such a fuss of the leadership that they fail to see what the same lot has done in the past, maybe under the shadow of a different bandwagon. The solution is a one-time ticket awarded for a five-year term. The same holds good for the prime minister too. Let him prove his worth. If Sher Shah, with his resources available to him, could do what he did in five years, then the already developed infrastructure should be no hurdle for the new prime minister. He should come empty-handed and go empty-handed. After all, he wants to serve the country. I am sure even that despite all these constraints we, a population of 160 million, can locate a good person who takes our nation forward as one nation.

We have been an egalitarian society in the past in our salt range and above. The system still exists. Feudalism was imposed on us. Even in the Mughal administrative set up, the job of mansabdar, jagirdar or faujdar and other officials was never given to a person because of his credentials of ancestry. One had to achieve it through hard work. Each man did his best till he lasted. It was a matter of intellect. A mansabdar was fined he would fail in his job. In our lands, the concept of the rule of five elders in our villages had existed from the dawn of our times. It still does in the rural areas.

The same councils still decide the most complex matters. The town committees can handle the urban side. Barring the new settlers, the bulk of our city population is and still retains strong rural contacts. The thana-katchehry culture must end. It is a redundant practice. State officials must provide service at the door of the litigant. The writ of the state should ensure that. The original Gazette notification of 2000 was a good step forward in the local bodies elections if its clauses had been implemented. The law had then stated that no one with any political affiliation was allowed to contest. He had to be a tax payer. If such laws are implemented in true sense, this can be a giant leap forward.

The ‘old’ politician will die his own death. No seat becomes a family seat. Politics is not a profession. Each person aspiring to be a worker for his people takes his time out. In a nutshell, this is what a revolution is all about. The five-year clause is the force that will ensure that the political process moves forward and the peoples’ will prevails. With the present population of 160 million and a projected 300 million in three decades, it is about time we took the first step in the right direction by getting rid of the dynastic rulers.

The writer has a 28-year experience in investigating the identity of the Indus-person in a historical context.

By: Naveed Tajammal

Archeeologists have discovered a cave underneath the Saint Georgeous Church in Jordan which they claim dates back to the time of Christ

By: Yasmeen Ali

Election Commission of Pakistan announced that an empty box will be now on the ballot paper-stating: ‘None of the above’  thereby rejecting all contesting candidates in a constituency. The news has taken political and media circles by storm. Most within these circles have opposed it, whereas the common educated man has hailed the decision. The Headmistress of a leading school wrote to me thus, “Brilliant idea.. gives the voter greater autonomy.. much needed autonomy actually.”

Advantages and disadvantages of this must be carefully evaluated before lauding or rejecting the idea. Those who oppose have declared it as a step against democracy. Is it? If the voter is allowed the chance of rejecting all-it offers him a broader base than to choose between the Devil and the Black Sea. In a number of cases, one hears people refraining from voting particularly in the urban areas because they do not want to vote for the same electable who have bought in change for the better. Urban areas are marked by low resident interaction, an absence of the ‘baithak’ (general commuting place for residents) culture. This is not only true of upscale areas but also lower-middle income neighborhoods.

However, biradari(clan)system holds sway still in voter decision, particularly in the rural area. They also fill the gap that is left by ideological absence of political parties. In this scenario the right of voters to reject any and every candidate offers an interesting option. An interesting question poses itself with the option. Let us assume 32% of total voters turn out for voting in a given constituency and more than 50% vote for ‘None of the above.’ This leaves 15% of votes behind to be then distributed between 4 or so candidates. Let us again assume that the candidate with the most votes manages to garner 7% votes- others bagging less. The question that comes to mind is: is the candidate with 7% of total votes cast in his favor legally and morally the winner of the contest?

What should the ECP do in this case?

If NOTA merely mean to state the number of people not willing to vote any contesting candidate in power on the ballot paper, they might as well not turn up to cast the votes. What weightage do the votes cast for NOTA signify if at all?

Logical follow-up to this scenario should be to call for a by-election with fresh candidates in the above given scenario. This will make contestants more answerable to the people they represent. This will make them more answerable in terms of broken promises to people they represent. It will also make them more answerable to the people in cases where rampant corruption committed, if any. In the final analysis let the people decide whom to vote for. That is the essence of democracy. This should also mean they cannot be appointed as advisors and chairpersons of organizations.

According to the July 14, 2008 edition of the “Times of India,” the caretaker Bangladeshi regime five years ago had also proposed that an election to a constituency should be cancelled if “no votes” somehow amounted to 50 per cent or more of the total votes cast—consequently leading to a by-election(The News 26^th Feb 2013).

This decision by ECP has come at a time when according to a survey of the British Council titled Next Generation Goes to The Ballot Box, showed that only one in five young adults expect their economic situation to improve over the next year. An overwhelming 96 percent of those surveyed said the country was heading in the wrong direction and almost a third said they would prefer military rule to democracy. Just 29 percent chose democracy as the best system for Pakistan, with 40 percent favoring sharia, saying it was the best for giving rights and freedom and promoting tolerance. We must nurture democracy with fresh water not just be lip service and implement it in its truest spirit.

Pakistan is not the first country to introduce NOTA. Various countries and territories like Bangladesh, the American state of Nevada, Greece and Columbia etc have incorporated the ‘No Vote” or “None of the above” option on their ballot papers. Canada and Spain etc do not specifically have this provision on their ballot papers, but they do allow their citizens the right to decline to vote or to leave the ballot papers blank in dissent. Former Soviet Union had this provision in 1991 and after its break-up; Russia had kept on giving this privilege to its voters till 2006.

Why so much hue and cries on a step that is in the very spirit of democracy and all that is democratic?

The writer is a lawyer and University Professor. She can be reached at Twitter ID @yasmeen_9

By: Yasmeen Ali

The Pakistan Political Palette is dotted with multi hues. Parties that have been there, seen it, done all, the wannabes waiting for their turn, individuals who have returned from yonder wanting to grab a part of the action. You name it, Pakistan has it. The trailer promises an action packed thriller. Grab your bag of pop corns everyone!

First there are the traditional arch rivals: PPP and PML-N. The five years of PPP governance have been marred by increase in terrorism, inflation, energy crisis. There are charges of widespread corruption. Whereas it is true that PPP could have improved upon its governance, it is also true that after the 18^th Amendment- a number of issues laid at the federation door were the responsibility of the provincial governments. PML-N and MQM cannot today, legitimately claim to oppose PPP after having governed their respective provinces/areas for the term. They were as much a part of the overall government as was PPP. Faraz Khan posting in Express Tribune Blogs published 11^th Feb. 2013 shares that according to the Punjab government, 30 billion rupees were spent on the Lahore Metro Bus Service. Overall the entire allocated money for Punjab infrastructure development is Rs63 billion which means that 50% or half of the development budget of Punjab was spent in Lahore. This excludes the cost of the underpasses and overhead bridges built in Lahore. Compared to this Rs 16.5 billion was allocated to the Health sector and Rs25 billion development budget for education in Punjab for the current year. From this 25 billion a total of Rs5 billion was spent on giving away laptops.

The province’s annual average growth rate of 2.5% between 2007 and 2011 lagged far behind the 3.4% for the rest of Pakistan, according to the Lahore-based Institute of Public Policy (IPP).No smaller energy generation plants were set up although Punjab is badly hit by power cuts, destroying businesses and disrupting normal life.

Under MQM’s tutelage, Karachi burned for five years. It continues burning today. Karachi is the hub of multiethnic people. The demographic makeup of the city has changed over the past few years, leading many to believe that the ongoing violence is a turf war being fought between MQM & ANP. Former Interior Minister Rehman Malik places target killed people in past five years at 1.363(Published 7 Sept 2012: Express Tribune). By any common sense standards this is a highly under estimated account. It will be pertinent to note here that Karachi was under MQM Mayor-ship from 2005 till 2010. Delimitation of constituencies is seen as a negative by MQM – which will be at a defensive position and might lose some constituencies, though it will remain the majority party of the Karachi.  MQM is already in court against the delimitations in Karachi.

Bringing in the new colors of the Political Palette is the PTI. The supporters of PTI are enthusiastic about the chances of their party in the forthcoming elections. Some over exuberant even claim a clean sweep. Brig. Farooq Hameed Khan® in an article published in a local newspaper states, “While October 30 kindled the candle of hope for Pakistan’s future, March 23 lighted the flame of a ‘Naya Pakistan’. On both occasions, Imran Khan displayed vision of a statesman and a national leader.” PTI has made an electoral alliance with Jamait-e-Islami-a step that makes sense since PTI lacks rural grounding and is restricted to urban areas only. It may stand to gain by this alliance. However, others point towards lack of any policies by PTI to bring about the much touted ‘Naya Pakistan.’ They also claim PTI lacks a well-knit team of people to achieve the claim. Induction of fall-outs of other parties, now close to the PTI Chief has not helped. That PTI will erode the vote bank of PML-N in Punjab owing to the latter’s bad governance is a foregone conclusion. To what degree they are able to harness their support and convert it into votes remains to be seen.

An unexpected entrant in the arena was Tahir-ul-Qadri, He claimed to “get rid of electoral dictatorship.” He raised questions about the integrity of the candidates in light of Article 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Mr Qadri insisted that before elections are held, a system must be put in place to probe the integrity of candidates. Since his party will not be contesting the forthcoming elections, some believe, his entry in the foray was aimed to build pressure in order to wean out the candidates who have failed to come up to the standards constitutionally laid down and flagrantly violated.

The side-dish is the re-entry of Former President General Pervez Musharraf. Columnist Cyril Almeida said Musharraf the politician today evokes the memory of Imran Khan from a decade ago: a high-wattage name, lots of media coverage, and absolutely no impact on the electorate. This may or may not turn out to be true in light of the welcome received by him on his return to Pakistan. Notwithstanding the challenges, both legal and otherwise, his party will manage to cull some seats, if they contest.  Musharraf had declared the rally by Tahir-ul-Qadri a success saying in unequivocal terms, ““I have supported them from the beginning.”

The three vote-cinching parties offer different goodies to the people. PML-N with its glossy manifesto, making wild promises- especially in relation to countering energy crisis-solutions suggested neither workable nor practical. PPP mainly banks on the Bhutto legacy and the fact that being the only national party, it has access to the Pakistani People. There are many populist promises thrown in, that work. MQM, talks about everything under the sun from education, poverty alleviation & empowerment, health, urban development and so on. One may pose the question, as to why these were not acted upon in these five years- maybe a query for another day!

Then there are the motley of smaller regional parties, smaller religious parties, the independents…all wanting a piece of the pie!

The million dollar question is: which way will the camel sit? And no, the Army is not taking over. The facts are different:  that the ‘electable’ will carry weight, electoral alliances will be cobbled together between the smaller/newer parties with one aim: to oppose PPP. Will their joint seats succeed in forming the government? Who will head that alliance? PTI Chief? Will PTI lose on table failing to carry other winners with it? Or, will PPP succeed in proving itself to be the only nationalist party it states in its manifesto? With whom will PML-N and MQM throw in their lot? One would not undermine PPP’s negotiation abilities.

One thing is clear. It will be a hung parliament with more cooks joining in to make the broth.

The writer is Author of, “A Comparative Analysis of Media & Media Laws in Pakistan.” She is a University Professor & may be reached at Twitter ID: @yasmeen_9

How he is wrong on some fronts and yet right on some others

Justice Markandey Katju, a former judge of the Indian Supreme Court who also served as Chief Justice of three high courts and who is currently chairman of India’s statutory media regulatory body, the Press Council of India, has lately been in the news for his outspoken ‘words of wisdom’ on almost everything from the state of media to the failures of governments in India. Recently, at a seminar in New Delhi, he shocked his own people by telling them that at least 90 percent of them were “idiots”. On the same occasion, Katju also took a freaky shot on Pakistan by distorting our history as a nation and questioning the very creation of Pakistan.

He called Pakistan a “fake” country which according to him was created artificially by the Britishers through their “bogus Two-Nation Theory”. Katju also predicted that “in the next 15-20 years India and Pakistan would reunite”. If this outlandish statement had come from a traditional fanatic Indian mindset, one could just ignore it. But coming from a retired judge of India’s superior judiciary with distinguished lineage and family history, who was known for his non-communal moderate outlook, this was nothing but a barefaced assault on Pakistan’s raison d’être. Obviously, it was for the Indians to take him to task for calling them “idiots” but for us in Pakistan, it surely was our challenge to prove him wrong and repudiate his aberrant ‘reunification’ theory.

Since Katju made his statement in his capacity as Chairman, Press Council of India, one expected our media to at least show some sensitivity to his remarks about Pakistan. In particular, those newspapers which have traditionally claimed ‘nationalist’ credentials should have editorially demolished Katju’s ‘reunification’ illusions by challenging him on what he thought of our nationhood and about our country’s future. This never happened. I could not resist responding to Katju’s slur and wrote an article giving a dispassionate account of history to establish why Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent, having lived together for centuries, remained poles apart eventually becoming two separate states in 1947.

Despite Jinnah’s efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity, the beginning of the 20th century saw a line being drawn, making it impossible for Hindus and Muslims to live together in India. What brought the simmering Muslim nationalism in the open was the character of the Congress rule in the Muslim minority provinces during 1937-39. The Congress policies in these provinces hurt Muslim susceptibilities leaving them with no doubt that in the Congress scheme of things, they could live only on sufferance of Hindus and as “second class” citizens. They were convinced that it was impossible to live in an undivided India after freedom from colonial rule because their interests would be completely suppressed.

In response to my article published in a major ultra-conservative newspaper, Katju sent me an e-mail message requesting for the e-mail address of that newspaper saying he wanted to respond to my article through a ‘rejoinder’. While sending him the requested e-mail address, I warned him that I was not sure if any newspaper in Pakistan, much less this particular one, will print anything questioning the very raison d’être of Pakistan. I was wrong. The esteemed paper published not only Katju’s bizarre “truth about Pakistan” devoting to it more than half of its op-ed page but also the text of my e-mail message that Katju had unethically and illegally shared with it in blatant breach of the privacy of the mail exchanged between two individuals. It was violation of the Code of Ethics followed by both the Press Councils of India and Pakistan.

In his article, Katju said that “Pakistan was doomed from its very inception”. According to him, “Created artificially by the British through their wicked policy of divide and rule and the bogus two-nation theory, Pakistan is bound to reunify with India.” He also distorted some of the historical facts. All said and done, Justice Katju’s article finding prominent space in a major Pakistani newspaper known for its ultra-conservative outlook and ideological ‘guardianship’ shocked the people of Pakistan. They couldn’t believe it. Even the Indians were surprised at this turn of the tide in Pakistan. The Indian Express (Pakistan all-praise for Markandey Katju, March 7) viewed this event worthy of special attention disclosing how the Pakistani “newspaper that had traditionally taken an anti-India stance surprisingly agreed to publish Katju’s article”.

According to The Indian Express, this decision came only because his daughter considered Katju’s article print worthy. She was quoted to have said: “I expected spirited feedback on it and haven’t been disappointed. My father knew I was publishing it and agreed. I’d be delighted to publish Katju again.” That sounded generous. One noted a dramatic change of direction in this paper’s known policy. Apparently, no one realised that there is one full clause in PCP’s Code of Ethics that forbids printing, publishing or disseminating any material, which may bring into contempt Pakistan or its people or tends to undermine its sovereignty or integrity as an independent country. It appeared to mark the end of an era. But the ‘Katju story’ did not end there.

My own read on the ‘feedback’ was disappointingly different. Pakistani readers paid no serious attention to Katju’s article. They just ignored it as yet another volley of a dogmatic if not rabid school of thought from across the border that never accepted Pakistan’s creation. From the Indian side, many knowledgeable comments were posted, mostly dismissive of Katju’s ‘reunification’ theory. One was, however, shocked at the unworthy and graceless language that some of the comments from across the border used for Pakistan and its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. They crossed all limits of civility. It was by no means a ‘spirited’ feedback. It was just filth and vulgarity. No newspaper in the world would allow abuse of its space for such trash. I am sure even Justice Katju must have been ashamed of the profanity heaped on our Quaid.

Katju presented his aberrant ‘reunification’ theory without being disrespectful to anyone. That is perhaps the spirit of his ‘satyam bruyat’. Jinnah is one of those rare leaders who received some of the greatest tributes paid to any one in modern times, some of them even from those who held a diametrically opposed viewpoint. Katju’s own illustrious grandfather, Dr Kailash Nath Katju, one of India’s leading lawyers who participated in the country’s freedom movement, then serving as Governor of West Bengal, also paid glowing tribute to our Quaid describing him as “an outstanding figure of this century not only in India, but in the whole world”.

Our Quaid did not live long to personally steer Pakistan to be what he thought would be “one of the greatest nations of the world”. No doubt, we have had a chequered history after independence. But it has been a failure of governance, not of the nationhood. A Hindu fanatic has every reason to challenge Pakistan’s nationhood. But if a man of Katju’s non-communal outlook is drawing negative conclusions on our future, there is cause for us to look at ourselves to find what after all is wrong with us. No matter what Katju’s motives are, he has indeed shown us a mirror.

What if Katju’s mirror shows us a hazy picture? We see a mutilated and disjointed nation debilitating itself physically as well as spiritually. We also see a country looted and plundered by its own rulers, and left with no dignity and sovereign independence. We are not even ashamed of what we are doing to ourselves. Isn’t it time for us to change and behave like a nation? Isn’t it also time, our increasingly family concentrated media owned its national responsibility and played its role in defending Pakistan’s independent statehood?

The writer is former foreign secretary, Pakistan.

The Article was Forwarded to Blog Moderator for publishing.

THIS IS A PAKPOTPOURRI EXCLUSIVE

If wisdom is the practical application of knowledge acquired through research,in pursuit of truth,through the right of free inquiry,to promote and help the happiness or well being of humans;’than the life proposed by this order,negates it,as it is a ritual based way of life,leading to the whirling dervish,and it seems out of place,because the life to lead as given in our code,negates this type of life,all humans must face the life,inclusive of,all’ its good times or the Bad,one cannot lead the eventual life of a hermit,as envisaged in this code,confined to,isolation/seclusion,the harsh realities cannot be avoided,in life,you must earn a living,and,living off,the alms,is hardly a worthy life,even though one may claim he is doing some,thing,holy ? In the true sense this is a classic case of escapism,or the, rah’ e’ farar.

Why the U.S.-Pakistani Alliance Isn’t Worth the Trouble
By Husain Haqqani

Washington has not had an easy time managing the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, to put it mildly. For decades, the United States has sought to change Pakistan’s strategic focus from competing with India and seeking more influence in Afghanistan to protecting its own internal stability and economic development. But even though Pakistan has continued to depend on U.S. military and economic support, it has not changed its behavior much. Each country accuses the other of being a terrible ally — and perhaps both are right.

Pakistanis tend to think of the United States as a bully. In their view, Washington provides desperately needed aid intermittently, yanking it away whenever U.S. officials want to force policy changes. Pakistanis believe that Washington has never been grateful for the sacrifice of the thousands of Pakistani military and security officials who have died fighting terrorists in recent decades, nor mourned the tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians whom those terrorists have killed. Many in the country, including President Asif Ali Zardari and General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, recognize that Pakistan has at times gone off the American script, but they argue that the country would be a better ally if only the United States showed more sensitivity to Islamabad’s regional concerns.

On the other side, Americans see Pakistan as the ungrateful recipient of almost $40 billion in economic and military assistance since 1947, $23 billion of it for fighting terrorism over the last decade alone. In their view, Pakistan has taken American dollars with a smile, even as it covertly developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s, passed nuclear secrets to others in the 1990s, and supported Islamist militant groups more recently. No matter what Washington does, according to a growing cadre of U.S. senators, members of Congress, and editorial writers, it can’t count on Pakistan as a reliable ally. Meanwhile, large amounts of U.S. aid have simply failed to invigorate Pakistan’s economy.

The May 2011 U.S. covert operation in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden brought the relationship to an unusually low point, making it harder than ever to maintain the illusion of friendship. At this point, instead of continuing to fight so constantly for so little benefit — money for Pakistan, limited intelligence cooperation for the United States, and a few tactical military gains for both sides — the two countries should acknowledge that their interests simply do not converge enough to make them strong partners. By coming to terms with this reality, Washington would be freer to explore new ways of pressuring Pakistan and achieving its own goals in the region. Islamabad, meanwhile, could finally pursue its regional ambitions, which would either succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country’s power.

FRIEND REQUEST

It is tempting to believe that tensions between the United States and Pakistan have never been worse. And to be sure, the public in each country currently dislikes the other: in a 2011 Gallup poll, Pakistan ranked among the least liked countries in the United States, along with Iran and North Korea; meanwhile, a 2012 Pew poll found that 80 percent of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States, with 74 percent seeing it as an enemy. Washington’s threats to cut off aid to Pakistan and calls in Islamabad to defend Pakistani sovereignty from U.S. drone incursions seem to represent a friendship that is spiraling downward.

But the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has never been good. In 2002, at arguably the height of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation against terrorism, a Pew poll found that 63 percent of Americans had unfavorable views of Pakistan, making it the fifth most disliked nation, behind Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Before that, in 1980, soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a Harris poll showed that a majority of Americans viewed Pakistan unfavorably, despite the fact that 53 percent supported U.S. military action to defend the country against communism. During the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan did not feature in U.S. opinion polls, but its leaders often complained of unfavorable press in the United States.

Pakistani distaste for the United States is nothing new, either. A 2002 Pew poll found that about 70 percent of Pakistanis disapproved of the United States. And their negativity predates the war on terrorism. The September 1982 issue of The Journal of Conflict Resolution carried an article by the Pakistani civil servant Shafqat Naghmi based on analysis of keywords used in the Pakistani press between 1965 and 1979. He found evidence for widespread anti-Americanism going back to the beginning of the study. In 1979, a hostile crowd burned down the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, and attacks on U.S. official buildings in Pakistan were reported even in the 1950s and 1960s.

From Pakistan’s founding onward, the two countries have tried to paper over their divergent interests and the fact that their publics do not trust one another with personal friendships at the highest levels. In 1947, Pakistan’s leaders confronted an uncertain future. Most of the world was indifferent to the new country — that is, except for its giant next-door neighbor, which was uncompromisingly hostile. The partition of British India had given Pakistan a third of the former colony’s army but only a sixth of its sources of revenue. From birth, therefore, Pakistan was saddled with a huge army it could not pay for and plenty of monsters to destroy.

British officials and scholars, such as Sir Olaf Caroe, who was the pre-partition governor of the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Ian Stephens, the editor of The Statesman, encouraged Pakistan’s founding fathers to keep the country’s large army as a protection against India. Lacking financing for it, though, Pakistani leaders turned to the United States, reasoning that Washington would be willing to foot some of the bill given Pakistan’s strategically important location at the intersection of the Middle East and South Asia.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the country’s founder and first governor-general, and most of his lieutenants in the Muslim League, Pakistan’s main political party, had never traveled to the United States and knew little about the country. To fill the role of ambassador to the United States, they chose the one among them who had, Mirza Abol Hassan Ispahani, who had toured the United States in the mid-1940s to drum up support for an independent Muslim state in South Asia. In a November 1946 letter to Jinnah, Ispahani explained what he knew of the American psyche. “I have learnt that sweet words and first impressions count a lot with Americans,” he wrote. “They are inclined to quickly like or dislike an individual or organization.” The Cambridge-educated lawyer tried his best to make a good impression and became known among the Washington elite for his erudition and sartorial style.

Back in Pakistan, Jinnah attempted to befriend Paul Alling, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador in Karachi, then Pakistan’s capital. In one of their meetings, Jinnah complained about the sweltering heat and offered to sell his official residence to the U.S. embassy. The ambassador sent him a gift of four ceiling fans. Jinnah was also at pains to give interviews to U.S. journalists, the best known of whom wasLife magazine’s Margaret Bourke-White. “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America,” Jinnah told her. “Pakistan is the pivot of the world, the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Like many Pakistani leaders after him, Jinnah hinted that he hoped the United States would pour money and arms into Pakistan. And Bourke-White, like many Americans after her, was skeptical. She sensed that behind the bluster was insecurity and a “bankruptcy of ideas . . . a nation drawing its spurious warmth from the embers of an antique religious fanaticism, fanned into a new blaze.”

The visceral anti-Americanism among many Pakistanis today makes it difficult to remember how persistently Jinnah and his ambassadors lobbied the United States for recognition and friendship in those earlier years. Yet the Americans were not convinced. As a State Department counselor, George Kennan, for example, saw no value in having Pakistan as an ally. In 1949, when he met Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, Kennan responded to Khan’s request to back Pakistan over India by saying, “Our friends must not expect us to do things which we cannot do. It is no less important that they should not expect us to be things which we cannot be.” Kennan’s message was reflected in the paltry amount of U.S. aid sent to the new country: of the $2 billion Jinnah had requested in September 1947, only $10 million came through. That dropped to just over half a million dollars in 1948, and to zero in 1949 and 1950.

BROTHERS IN ARMS

Pakistan finally got what it wanted with the election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, embraced the idea of exchanging aid for Pakistani support of U.S. strategic interests. He saw Pakistan as a vital link in his scheme to encircle the Soviet Union and China. The aggressively anticommunist Dulles also relished the thought of having a large army of professional soldiers with British-trained officers on the right side in the Cold War. Influenced by earlier descriptions of Pakistanis, Dulles believed them to be especially martial: “I’ve got to get some real fighting men in the south of Asia,” he told the journalist Walter Lippmann in 1954. “The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis.”

Muhammad Ali Bogra, who had taken up the post of Pakistani ambassador to the United States in 1952, was also eager to cement the friendship. He was as successful as his predecessor at cultivating American elites, especially Dulles, who was already leery of India’s leaders due to their decision to stay nonaligned during the Cold War. Bogra ensured that his own anticommunist sentiments were well known to Dulles, as well as to the journalists and politicians with whom Bogra went bowling in Washington. Meanwhile, Eisenhower tasked Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with earning the respect of powerful Pakistanis — particularly the military commander General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who would rule the country by the end of the decade. Ayub Khan was instrumental in installing Bogra as Pakistan’s prime minister in 1953, after a palace coup, in the hope that Bogra’s friendship with the Americans would expedite the flow of arms and development assistance to Pakistan. Indeed, military and economic aid to Pakistan began to rise rapidly; it would hit $1.7 billion by the end of the decade.

In return, the United States got Pakistan to join two anti-Soviet security arrangements: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact (later called the Central Treaty Organization), in 1955. But there were already signs of trouble. Any notion that Pakistan would join either alliance grouping in a war was quickly dispelled, as Pakistan (like many others) refused to contribute much money or any forces to the organizations. Dulles traveled to Pakistan in 1954 looking for military bases for use against the Soviet Union and China. On his return, he tried to conceal his disappointment in the lack of immediate progress. In a memo he wrote for Eisenhower after the trip, he described U.S.-Pakistani relations as an “investment” from which the United States was “not in general in a position to demand specific returns.” According to Dulles, the U.S. presence in Pakistan meant that the United States could expand its influence over time, leading to “trust and friendship.”

Ayub Khan, for his part, assumed that once Pakistan’s military had been equipped with modern weapons — ostensibly to fight the Communists — it could use them against India without causing a major breach with the United States. In his memoirs, he acknowledged that “the objectives that the Western powers wanted the Baghdad Pact to serve were quite different from the objectives we had in mind.” But he argued that Pakistan had “never made any secret of [its] intentions or [its] interests” and that the United States knew Pakistan would use its new arms against its eastern neighbor. Still, when Pakistan tested Ayub Khan’s theory in 1965, by infiltrating Kashmir and precipitating an all-out war with India, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson suspended the supply of military spare parts to both India and Pakistan. In retaliation, in 1970, Pakistan shut down a secret CIA base in Peshawar that had been leased to the United States in 1956 to launch U-2 reconnaissance flights. (Although Pakistan had made the decision to shut down the base right after the 1965 war, it preferred to simply not renew the lease rather than terminate it prematurely.)

U.S.-Pakistani relations were scaled back after the suspension of military aid, but neither side could give up on trying to find some common ground. Ayub Khan’s successor as president, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, agreed to serve as an intermediary between the United States and China, facilitating the secret trip to Beijing in 1971 by Henry Kissinger, then U.S. President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser. Later that year, Nixon showed his gratitude for Pakistan’s help by favoring West Pakistan against separatist East Pakistan and its Indian supporters during the civil war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The United States played down West Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan, and Nixon tried to bypass Congress to provide some materiel to West Pakistani forces. But that did not stop the country from dividing. As a civilian government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked up the pieces in the new, smaller Pakistan, the United States and Pakistan maintained some distance. During a 1973 visit by Nixon to Pakistan, Bhutto offered Nixon a naval base on the coast of the Arabian Sea, which Nixon declined. By the time the relationship had started to warm again, when Washington lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan in the mid-1970s, Pakistan had already sought economic support from the Arab countries to its west, which were by then growing flush with petrodollars.

OFF BASE

The next time the United States and Pakistan tried to work together, it was to expand a relatively small Pakistani-backed insurgency in Afghanistan at the United States’ request. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, the United States saw an opportunity to even the score following its poor showing in the Vietnam War and bleed the Soviet army dry. The Afghan mujahideen, which had been trained by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and funded by the CIA, would help. Pakistan’s military ruler, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, made his sales pitch: “The Soviet Union is sitting on our border,” he told an American journalist in a 1980 interview. “Has the free world any interest left in Pakistan?” Later, Zia even surprised the U.S. State Department counselor, Robert McFarlane, with a sweetener: “Why don’t you ask us to grant [you] bases?”

The United States was no longer interested in bases in Pakistan, but it did want to use Pakistan as a staging ground for the Afghan insurgency. So Washington not only funneled arms and money to the mujahideen across the border but also quadrupled its aid to Pakistan. Islamabad had been repeatedly asking for F-16 fighter aircraft in the late 1970s and early 1980s; the Reagan administration found a way to grant them, even urging Congress to waive a ban on military and economic aid to countries that acquire or transfer nuclear technology. James Buckley, then undersecretary of state for international security affairs, rationalized in The New York Times that such American generosity would address “the underlying sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.” In 1983, the first batch of the fighter jets arrived in Rawalpindi.

But as did the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, so the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in 1989 exposed the tensions beneath the surface of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. Differences between Washington and Islamabad over who should lead a post-Soviet Afghanistan quickly emerged and unsettled the two countries’ unspoken truce. Pakistan, of course, wanted as much influence as possible, believing that a friendly Afghanistan would provide it with strategic depth against India. The United States wanted a stable noncommunist government that could put Afghanistan back in its place as a marginal regional power.

For the first time, the issue of Pakistani support for terrorist groups also became a sore point. In a 1992 letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Nicholas Platt, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, warned that the United States was close to declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism: “If the situation persists, the secretary of state may find himself required by law to place Pakistan in the U.S.G. [U.S. government] state sponsors of terrorism list. . . . You must take concrete steps to curtail assistance to militants and not allow their training camps to operate in Pakistan or Azad Kashmir [the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir].” That threat was hollow, but the United States did find other ways to punish its erstwhile ally. In 1991, Washington cut off military aid to Pakistan after President George H. W. Bush failed to certify to Congress that Pakistan was adhering to its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Between 1993 and 1998, the United States imposed strict sanctions on Pakistan because of its continued nuclear progress and tests. And it imposed more sanctions between 2000 and 2001 in response to the 1999 military coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. Civilian aid, meanwhile, bottomed out.

WITH US OR AGAINST US

Acrimony continued to color the relationship until 2001, when, after the 9/11 attacks, Washington once again sought to work with Islamabad, hoping that this time, Pakistan would fix its internal problems and change its strategic direction for good. But there was little enthusiasm among Pakistan’s public or its military elite, where the country’s decision-making power lay, for an embrace of the United States or its vision for the region. Meanwhile, Pakistani diplomats in the United States spent most of their time responding to Congress’ criticism of Pakistan’s double-dealing in regard to terrorists. The role of ambassador during this period was first held by a former journalist, Maleeha Lodhi, and then by a career foreign service officer, Ashraf Qazi. They worked to build the case that Pakistan was the frontline state in the war on terrorism by reaching out to the U.S. media and lobbying Congress with the help of the growing Pakistani American community. With support from the George W. Bush administration, the ambassadors were able to fend off criticism and get huge aid packages approved. But skeptics, such as the journalist Selig Harrison, pointed out that Pakistan was selling “bad policy through good salesmen.” These particular salesmen were succeeded by two retired generals, Jehangir Karamat and Mahmud Ali Durrani, who attempted to work more closely with U.S. military officers, assuring them that reports of continued Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban were exaggerated. On the U.S. side, Anthony Zinni, who had been commander of the U.S. Central Command at the time of Musharraf’s coup and remained in touch with Musharraf after his own retirement, spoke publicly of the benefit of being able to communicate “soldier to soldier.” Still, the soldier-ambassadors were unable to overcome the negative press about Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan.

U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan during this period focused on forging close ties with the country’s leader, Musharraf. When Musharraf’s control weakened toward the end of the decade, Anne Patterson, who was U.S. ambassador between 2007 and 2010, tried to reach out to civilian Pakistani politicians by meeting the leaders of all of the country’s major political parties. To cover the waterfront, Admiral Mike Mullen, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pursued a personal friendship with Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani. Mullen held 26 meetings with Kayani in four years and often described him as a friend. But by the end of his tenure, Mullen expressed frustration that nothing had worked to change Kayani’s focus: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI,” he said in a speech to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2011, “jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”

In the end, during Patterson’s and Mullen’s tenures, Musharraf’s regime crumbled and a civilian government took office. From the start, the new administration, led by Zardari, sought to transform the U.S.-Pakistani relationship into what he called a strategic partnership. Zardari wanted to mobilize popular and political support in Pakistan for counterterrorism, as the United States made a long-term commitment to Pakistan through a multiyear foreign assistance package including more civilian aid. At the same time, the two countries would work together to devise a mutually acceptable Afghan endgame.

As Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, I tried to carry out this agenda and serve as a bridge between the two sides. I arranged dozens of meetings among civilian and military leaders from both sides. Senior U.S. officials, including James Jones, the national security adviser; Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state; and Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA and later secretary of defense, were generous with their time. Senators John McCain, Diane Feinstein, and Joseph Lieberman hashed out the various elements of a strategic partnership, and Senator John Kerry spent countless hours constructing models for Afghan negotiations. Richard Holbrooke, who was the Obama administration’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan before his death in 2011, shuttled between the capitals, seeking to explain U.S. policies to Pakistani officials and secure congressional support for Pakistan. Over several weekends, when our spouses were away from Washington, Holbrooke and I spent hours together, going to the movies or meeting for lunch in Georgetown. We spoke about ways to secure a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support. Convinced that the Pakistani military held the key to stability in the region, President Barack Obama conveyed to Pakistan that the United States wanted to help Pakistan feel secure and be prosperous but that it would not countenance Pakistan’s support for jihadist groups that threatened American security.

But in the end, these attempts to build a strategic partnership got nowhere. The civilian leaders were unable to smooth over the distrust between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries and intelligence agencies. And the lack of full civilian control over Pakistan’s military and intelligence services meant that, as ever, the two countries were working toward different outcomes. Admittedly, however, things might not have been all that much better had the civilians been in full control; it is easier for strongmen to give their allies what they want regardless of popular wishes, whether it be U-2 and drone bases or arming the Afghan mujahideen. My own tenure as ambassador came to an abrupt end in November 2011, just weeks after an American businessman of Pakistani origin falsely accused me of using him as an intermediary to seek American help in thwarting a military coup immediately after the U.S. raid that killed bin Laden. The allegation made no sense because as ambassador, I had direct access to American officials and did not need the help of a controversial businessman to convey concerns about the Pakistani military threatening civilian rule. The episode confirmed again, if confirmation was needed, that supporting close ties with the United States is an unpopular position in Pakistan and that there is a general willingness in Pakistan’s media, judicial, and intelligence circles to believe the worst of anyone trying to mend the frayed partnership.

TILL THE BITTER END

Given this history of failure, it is time to reconsider whether the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is worth preserving. At least for the foreseeable future, the United States will not accept the Pakistani military’s vision of Pakistani preeminence in South Asia or equality with India. And aid alone will not alter Islamabad’s priorities. Of course, as Pakistan’s democracy grows stronger, the Pakistanis might someday be able to have a realistic debate about what the national interest is and how it should be pursued. But even that debate might not end on terms the United States likes. According to 2012 poll data, for example, although most Pakistanis would favor better ties with India (69 percent of those polled), a majority of them still see India as the country’s biggest threat (59 percent).

With the United States and Pakistan at a dead end, the two countries need to explore ways to structure a nonallied relationship. They had a taste of this in 2011 and 2012, when Pakistan shut down transit lines in response to a NATO drone strike on the Afghan-Pakistani border that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. But this failed to hurt the U.S. war effort; the United States quickly found that it could rely on other routes into Afghanistan. Doing so was more costly, but the United States’ flexibility demonstrated to Islamabad that its help is not as indispensable to Washington as it once assumed. That realization should be at the core of a new relationship. The United States should be unambiguous in defining its interests and then acting on them without worrying excessively about the reaction in Islamabad.

The new coolness between the two countries will eventually provoke a reckoning. The United States will continue to do what it feels it has to do in the region for its own security, such as pressing ahead with drone strikes on terrorist suspects. These will raise hackles in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani military leadership is based. Pakistani military leaders might make noise about shooting down U.S. drones, but they will think long and hard before actually doing so, in light of the potential escalation of hostilities that could follow. Given its weak hand (which will grow even weaker as U.S. military aid dries up), Pakistan will probably refrain from directly confronting the United States.

Once Pakistan’s national security elites recognize the limits of their power, the country might eventually seek a renewed partnership with the United States — but this time with greater humility and an awareness of what it can and cannot get. It is also possible, although less likely, that Pakistani leaders could decide that they are able to do quite well on their own, without relying heavily on the United States, as they have come to do over the last several decades. In that case, too, the mutual frustrations resulting from Pakistan’s reluctant dependency on the United States would come to an end. Diplomats of both countries would then be able to devote their energies to explaining  their own and understanding the other’s current positions instead of constantly repeating clashing narratives of what went wrong over the last six decades. Even if the breakup of the alliance did not lead to such a dramatic denouement, it would still leave both countries free to make the tough strategic decisions about dealing with the other that each has been avoiding. Pakistan could find out whether its regional policy objectives of competing with and containing India are attainable without U.S. support. The United States would be able to deal with issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation without the burden of Pakistani allegations of betrayal. Honesty about the true status of their ties might even help both parties get along better and cooperate more easily. After all, they could hardly be worse off than they are now, clinging to the idea of an alliance even though neither actually believes in it. Sometimes, the best way forward in a relationship lies in admitting that it’s over in its current incarnation.

Originally published: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138845/husain-haqqani/breaking-up-is-not-hard-to-do?page=show