Wikileaks, Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Report

Report By: Muhammad Abdullah Gul 

 

On 25 July 2010, the New York Times carried an explosive story by Mark Mazzetti, Jane
Perlez, Eric Schmitt and Andrew W. Lehren about some 92,000 classified Pentagon
documents which had passed into the hands of Wikileaks, a Sweden-based whistle-
blower website headed by Julian Assange. Ostensibly, the leak sent shock waves through
the US Administration – not just for the sheer volume of the leaked material but also
because the revelations could significantly affect the course of the war in Afghanistan.
The documents comprised a host of field intelligence reports initiated by covert sources,
combat units and the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security
(NDS). Much of the plethora of documents is a compilation of assorted reports known as
“collation” in the intelligence craft. Such stuff is not deemed to be intelligence until it is
sifted, corroborated and analysed for its value, the authenticity of the source and the
plausibility of the information. The documents cover the period from 2004 to 2009. The
fact that that such a large array of reports remained unprocessed for this long is a poor
reflection on the Pentagon’s efficiency.

Dubious veracity

Wikileaks has, thus far, released 77,000 of the documents, of which 180 reports – mostly
originating from Afghan intelligence – pertain to the dubious role of Pakistan, its Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), and, especially, of retired General Hamid Gul who headed the
ISI in the crucial years of the Afghan jihad during the Soviet Union’s occupation of
Afghanistan. Gul earned a reputation as the architect of the Soviet defeat and the
ignominious withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Once a darling of US strategists and intelligence big-wigs, Gul later became a bitter critic
of the post-Reagan policies of the US. He routinely charges America of betraying the
Afghan nation and causing an airplane crash in which then-president of Pakistan, General
Zia ul-Haq, and dozens of Pakistan’s top military brass died. Gul also claimed that the
9/11 events were an inside job and openly supported the Afghan resistance against what
he described as the US-led occupation of Afghanistan which was not dissimilar to that of
the Soviet Union.
He has repeatedly refuted the charges against him on various international media
channels such as Al Jazeera, CNN, and BBC (for example, on the 25, 26, 27 and 28 July
2010), and labelled the reports as “preposterous”, “fictional” and deliberate
“disinformation” to demonise him and the ISI in an attempt to find a scapegoat for the US
military’s failures in Afghanistan. In these interviews, Gul also offered to travel to the US
to face charges in court or be heard by the US Senate or Congress. In 2008, the US
proposed a motion at the United Nations 1267 Committee to have him placed on the
UN’s international terrorist list. He was saved by China, which blocked the move by
applying a technical hold for lack of evidence.
The Pakistani government also strongly rebutted the Wikileaks reports regarding the
alleged double role of the ISI in the Afghan war. Interestingly, a Pakistani official
revealed that days before the New York Times story, US defence officials had advised
their Pakistani counterparts to disregard the Wikileaks documents release.

Human rights and military discipline

Apart from documents relating to Pakistan, the rest of the 77,000 documents cover a vast
spectrum of excesses and human rights abuses committed by US and NATO forces, and
narrate a harrowing tale of atrocities against innocent civilians. No less than 20,000
fatalities have been documented, painting a heart-rending picture of a callous disregard of
Geneva Conventions and US laws. Task Force 373, a secret force, stands out as the most 

trigger-happy, ruthless bunch of soldiers who seem to have exceeded every limit. It is not
clear whether this force was ever authorised by the US Congress. If not, it would cast a
negative light on the Pentagon, raising questions as to whether the Pentagon (or a certain
element within it) had turned into a “rogue” institution.

Questions

Wikileaks is still holding back some 15,000 documents. There are tremendous efforts by
the US administration to block the release of these documents or, at least, to expunge the
identities of sources and other named figures lest their security be jeopardised.
The whole sordid affair begs many a thorny question, and points to yawning cavities in
the US systems of defence and intelligence. The more glaring of these questions, each of
which warrants a separate query, are:
a. Is the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) overly dependent on security
contractors and largely amateurish Afghan intelligence operatives?
b. Is there an attitudinal conflict among American policy makers on Afghanistan?
That is, is there a conflict between those advocating winning the hearts and minds
of Afghan people and those operators on the ground who are bent on the
systematic and wilful alienation of the Afghan people?
c. Does a dichotomy really exist between the stated US position of Pakistan as a
front-line ally without whose support victory cannot be perceived, and the real
perception of its role as a double crosser playing both sides? Or is this dichotomy
inspired by extraneous influences which wish to drive a wedge into US-Pakistan
relations?
d. How will the leaks impact on US-Pakistan and Pakistan-Karzai government
relations?
e. How will they affect the war in Afghanistan and determine its outcome?
f. Were the leaks deliberate and purposeful a la My Lai in Vietnam, which set in
motion the public demand for withdrawal?

US intelligence methodology

Over the years, the mammoth US intelligence establishment has shown deficiencies,
fissures and failures. If glaring ones such as 9/11, Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction,
and the failure to capture the world’s most wanted terrorists are not enough evidence of
its inherent flaws, Wikileaks has exposed it to the core. The human intelligence (humint)
aspect of the US is well-known to have suffered from protracted neglect, poor funding,
and the absence of a cogent cause to inspire enthusiasm.
As a consequence, the US substituted security contractors for regular and disciplined
operatives. Most of these security contractors were former employees of the CIA, FBI
and other agencies which thrived on old-buddy cronyism. Their only motivation was
money. They are a tired and lacklustre group of people who rely mostly on “paper
milling” – intelligence parlance for the production of make-believe reports. The bulk of
the reports on Pakistan is the handiwork of Afghan intelligence agencies which are
infested by communist die-hards looking to avenge their humiliation at the hands of 

Pakistan and the ISI. To top it off, the Indian external intelligence agency – the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW) – has established a strong field intelligence network in
Afghanistan. Its insidious influence on Afghan intelligence agencies in an effort to malign
Pakistan is an open secret.
Task Force 373 uses tactics and methods which run counter to the explicit purpose of the
military high command. About 100,000 US security contractors have proven to be loose
cannons. They disregard operational instructions, and are only in pursuit of quick results
to earn more dollars. It was a disaster ab initio to mix mercenaries and burnt-out
intelligence veterans with regular troops. The architects of this harebrained idea will
realise the consequences of their folly.

Between policy and posture

The US and NATO official position on Pakistan as a front-line state in the war against
terrorism is a euphemism. In reality, Pakistan has always been suspected either of doing
less than it could, or, worse, of complicity with some Taliban factions fighting US and
NATO troops. No wonder, then, that each category and tier of the US leadership – from
the Bush to the Obama administrations – continued to press Pakistan to do more.
While analysing the nature and extent of Pakistan’s cooperation, one must bear in mind
the circumstances under which Pakistan was recruited into this war. It was literally forced
on board the American warship. The Pakistan leadership wrongly assumed that the war
would be a short, swift retribution which would end in a few months. They failed to
fathom the latent and long-term intentions of the Bush administration’s war hawks. It was
only after the Karzai government was foisted on Afghanistan, as a result of the Bonn
dispensation and the induction of India, Pakistan’s arch-rival, into the Afghan game that
Pakistani authorities realised their mistake in unconditionally giving in to US demands.
They felt cheated but could do little to redress the situation. Then-President Pervez
Musharraf’s quick surrender to US diktat had left the Pakistani nation and its institutions
dazed and bewildered. They were torn between the demands of the US agenda and their
national interests. The military and the ISI were hard put to maintain equilibrium. Drone
attacks by the CIA in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and clandestine deployment of US Special
Forces and security contractors inside Pakistan further exacerbated frayed sentiments. To
the Pakistani masses, from where most of the soldiers are drawn, it was somebody else’s
dirty war which Pakistan had to fight under duress. It reflects positively on the army and
the ISI that there was no serious breach of discipline. But to expect an enthusiastic and
wholesome participation under these conditions would be asking for too much.

Impact on US-Pakistan relations

That the invaders would fail in Afghanistan was axiomatic for even elementary students
of Afghan affairs; and no one is better educated on this subject than the ISI. Should the
ISI not have maintained liaison with the real soul of the Afghan people, which is
manifested in the national resistance symbolised by the Taliban? Let no one be duped into
believing otherwise! But material support to the resistance is quite another matter. With
US spies all over Pakistan, having logged deep into its systems, such an audacity cannot
even be imagined, save by Pentagon stalwarts.
The US policy towards Pakistan was described aptly – though insultingly – by
Condoleezza Rice and Hillary Clinton as a “carrot and stick” doctrine that would keep
Pakistan on the leash and aligned to US objectives. This policy seems to have worked
reasonably well for America. Pakistan has been held to the course by the US promoting a
dictator, and then imposing a truncated democracy through an externally-brokered deal 

called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). America’s whip hand, however,
began to test the limits of national tolerance after the Mumbai attacks, when the US
started openly to promote India’s brow-beating tactics against Pakistan on
unsubstantiated charges. Following Obama’s 1 December 2009 policy speech, the US
attitude began to change. It is now less belligerent, and often placatory, towards Pakistan.
There is also a perceptible shift in the policy from dealing with government to addressing
the people of Pakistan. This is a healthy change indicative of a possible focus on an exit
strategy.
The recent floods in Pakistan have enhanced the need for a fresh approach. Currently,
there seem to be two overriding American concerns. Firstly, to create an environment for
the graceful exit of the US from Afghanistan, while safeguarding its core interests and
making room for India in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. Secondly, to thwart a populist –
inevitably anti-American ground-swell – in the wake of the catastrophic deluge in
Pakistan. How these can objectives be achieved with the help of a tottering and largely
dysfunctional democracy in Pakistan will be a daunting challenge for American policy
makers.
Pakistan and the US need each other for their own good reasons, but India is the obstacle,
and it will remain so until the Kashmir issue is dealt with.
Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai began to lean towards Pakistan after Obama’s 1
December 2009 speech. To show his altered preferences, he fired his Pakistan-hating
intelligence czar, Amrullah Saleh. After the Wikileaks affair, however, Karzai revealed
his true intentions when he demanded that the US bomb Pakistan. But that simmered
down rather quickly. Perhaps the Americans whispered the same gospel in his ears as
they did for Pakistan: “Don’t take it too seriously.”

Outcomes and purposes

It is too early to pass judgement, but there are unerring similarities between My Lai and
the Wikileaks affair. Lieutenant William Calley and Captain Ernest L. Medina’s
misconduct then, and the TF-373’s misdemeanour now reflect the same propensity for
frustration spawned by failures. How close are the parallels of General Westmoreland’s
demand for more troops and General Stanley McChrystal’s urge for the surge,
intelligence failures, and search for scapegoats – Cambodia then and Pakistan now? It’s
an uncanny match of the scenarios, a rebirth of the tragedy that was Vietnam.
Afghanistan is a wrong war at a wrong place against a wrong enemy. Not a single Afghan
has been found involved in terrorism outside the war zone. “Reversing Taliban’s
momentum” was not the original aim of the NATO war. At this stage, it would be like
defeating the Afghan nation; it would be mission impossible. The initial goal was to
disperse Al-Qaeda and capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. All western intelligence sources
believe Osama Bin Laden is not in Afghanistan, or, at least, not in the southern part of
Afghanistan where much of the US and NATO forces are committed. Leon E. Panetta
said there were no more than 60 to 100 Al-Qaeda operatives in that part of the world.
That many may be present in any European country. The reality is that Al-Qaeda has long
since migrated to the Red Sea area to be in closer proximity to its strategic “centre of
gravity” – the Middle East.
The hard truth is that the war in Afghanistan is a lost cause for America. The problem is
how to convince the Pentagon and the self-indulgent, bigoted neo-cons who would not let
reason get the better of their unrealistic ambitions. Obama’s heart is in the right place. He
knows he came into the Oval Office on the promise of change, and he was aware of the
stumbling blocks on his way to change. As a master chess player, he let the Pentagon
have its say (two surges since his inauguration) but asked for results. The Pentagon
merely reinforced failure and could not deliver.
Operation Moshtarak, in February 2010, was an unmitigated disaster, and the Kandahar
operation is a non-starter. One obstacle in Obama’s march towards his objective has been
removed. If allowed to operate with freedom, Wikileaks will remove the other. Its
publication of the remaining 15,000 documents is bound to whip up a public debate
reminiscent of the Nixon years. Already, the antiwar opinion has climbed to 62 percent. A
“moratorium” – as in the case of Vietnam – may well be in the offing, thanks to
Wikileaks. Is Obama playing Nixon? If yes, Wikileaks is a gift to him. Or, did he manage
the gift? Whatever the case, the draw-down from Afghanistan is likely to begin as per
schedule, if not earlier. Conventional wisdom commands that losses be cut.
(The writer is researcher whose work focuses on Indo-Pak Sub-Continent).

NOTE:This was initially carried by Al Jazeera.

 

 

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Comments

  • Niaz Gul  On October 17, 2010 at 9:00 am

    Thanking for you Re: Fwd: Wikileaks, Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Report
    Niaz Gul Shahab
    Sub Editor
    Daily Mashriq Peshawar

    • Abdullah Gul  On October 17, 2010 at 12:34 pm

      Thank you for appreciating.

      Abdullah Gul

  • SAMEEH  On October 17, 2010 at 10:44 am

    There is nothing here that has not repeatedly been stated over & over.
    What’s new?

    • Abdullah Gul  On October 17, 2010 at 12:33 pm

      Sir, It was published by Aljazeera on 5th Sep 2010. So, it was absolutely new when it was written.

      Abdullah

  • Rameez Sultan  On October 17, 2010 at 10:47 am

    1-The leaked documents are based entirely on field reports filed by a variety of operatives in Afghanistan–primarily belonging to the Northern Alliance.
    Out of the 92,000 leaked documents, only 180 contain ISI references and of these only 30 mention the ISI in negative terms regarding Taliban-supporting activities.
    Of these 180 documents with references to the ISI, most of these reports have a disclaimer by the author at the end where the source was referred to simply as an “informant” and it was stated that this source was either not reliable or working only for monetary gains for either the Afghan intelligence, Indians or Afghan warlords!
    The source was referred to simply by initials! Interestingly where the ISI is mentioned, it also states in the disclaimer that the information cannot be verified and therefore cannot be “used to make policies” (all this is on the Nation website, the Pakistan Patirot website and Rupee News website).
    It is ISI bashing time again and this comes easy for the Western and Indian media especially, but also for the media at home since the ISI has figured as a larger than life organisation since the US-led war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. And undoubtedly the ISI has at times been highly controversial in the activities it has undertaken especially domestically. Both during period of civilian democracy and military rule, the ISI has been used by those in power and even today the ruling party is not devoid of this temptation, unfortunately.
    Of course, like all intelligence agencies with an external agenda, such as CIA and RAW, the ISI has its own external agenda. But it needs to also be understood that the ISI is not an independent entity and the decision-making hierarchy of the organisation comes on routine postings from the military, primarily the army. So its external activities reflect the policies of the government, but especially the military. Be that as it may, post-9/11, the ISI has had to pay for its past sins in seeing itself demonised by the US and India – even though the former is supposed to be an ally of this country. Every time the chips are down for the US in Afghanistan, somehow or the other the ISI is lambasted by “leaks” to the Western, especially the compliant US media. It would appear that the CIA’s failures, as well as the US and NATO military failures, are all a result solely of the ISI! Now if only the ISI was really so effective, efficient and powerful, India’s occupation of Kashmir would have ended and Afghanistan’s future would have been moulded according to its desires! Unfortunately, that is not the case and the ISI is as riddled with inefficiencies as any large bureaucratic organisation is, but undoubtedly, it has better ground intelligence in this region than the US and its CIA since the latter has a blunderbuss approach to human intelligence gathering and has no sensitivity to nuances of any kind.
    Be that as it may, the latest round of ISI bashing rather obviously sponsored by the CIA to hide its own failures in Afghanistan, once again, has come with the WikiLeaks’ story. Apart from The Guardian newspaper which showed some healthy scepticism about the leaked information, for the biased US media like The New York Times this was a journalistic feast – enough to feed the deep-seated anti-Muslim and especially anti-Pakistan bias that now dominates the American media. But let us get some facts straightened first and one has to concede that WikiLeaks itself is credible anti-war site. But what the media has done in terms of factual distortions of even these unverifiable leaks is dangerous and cannot simply be ignored by Pakistan because we are once again the targets.
    First of all, the leaked documents are based entirely on field reports filed by a variety of operatives in Afghanistan, allegedly primarily belonging to the Northern Alliance.
    Second, out of the 92,000 leaked documents, only 180 contain ISI references and of these only 30 mention the ISI in negative terms regarding Taliban-supporting activities.
    Third, of these 180 documents with references to the ISI, most of these reports have a disclaimer by the author at the end where the source was referred to simply as an “informant” and it was stated that this source was either not reliable or working only for monetary gains for either the Afghan intelligence, Indians or Afghan warlords! Or else the source was referred to simply by initials! Interestingly where the ISI is mentioned, it also states in the disclaimer that the information cannot be verified and therefore cannot be “used to make policies” (all this is on the Nation website, the Pakistan Patirot website and Rupee News website). So where does that leave the actual content of these leaked reports?
    Officials in Pakistan are convinced that the CIA, when it found out about the leaks, sought to divert the expansive details of its own failures in Afghanistan by shifting the focus on to the ISI – a favourite bete noir of the Western media. According to WikiLeaks the source for the leaked documents sought to prevent the publication of some of them for fear of sensitive information! There is also a feeling in some quarters that the CIA has deliberately chosen to once again target the ISI because of the rising anti-war tide within the US. Most observers in the know now recognise that the US and NATO have lost the war militarily in Afghanistan and bad intelligence is certainly one of the causes. So what better way to escape blame than to put everything on the ISI. The timing of the “leaks” is not without purpose.
    Be that as it may, the fact is that it is time for Pakistan to sever its links and cooperation with the US. How can we have information and intelligence sharing with a country that has systematically done and continues to do a hatchet job on our premier intelligence agency, as well as the Pakistan military in general? From our nuclear programme to the ISI, there is a continuous ongoing war being waged on us by the US. It may not be a military war but it has economic, political, diplomatic and psychological components. What is simply absurd is why the “PakMil” – a term Mullen has coined to show his intimacy with General Kayani and is used only by him when he meets the COAS apparently – is not seeing the ground realities? Instead of the ISPR issuing press releases now suddenly condemning the drone attacks in an attempt to fool the Pakistani nation, when they know only too well that these are being carried out with the support of the Pakistan civil and military leadership, the military should take a long hard look at what the US is doing to Pakistan on all fronts. If the Pakistani government, including the military, sees the drones as doing more harm than good, why do they remain complicit in this policy? Should they not send a clear message to the US by downing one of these drones?
    The evidence is piling up showing US hostile intent and effectively the US itself is becoming less of a friend – if ever it was – and more of an enemy. Even if we feel that is too drastic a conclusion, it is certainly a hostile player from Pakistan’s perspective. So before we lose everything to the Indo-US nexus, let us alter our dynamics with the US and treat it as a hostile state. The US is in a quandary and we are its only way out. Let us use this tiny window of opportunity to assert our national interests and deal with the US on our terms while it remains in its Afghan quagmire. Let General Kayani see who the real foe is – in military terms at least and the rulers rid themselves of particularistic interests to see the real foe in politico-diplomatic terms before it is too late. Will “PakMil” recognise the real foe? BY:Shireen Mazari

    • Abdullah Gul  On October 17, 2010 at 12:36 pm

      Dr Sahiba

      Well said

      Abdullah Gul

  • Bajwa  On October 17, 2010 at 10:50 am

    The classified U.S. military documents related to the war in Afghanistan leaked by WikiLeaks.org paint a grim picture of collusion between Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and members of the Afghan Taliban. While the allegations laid out in the documents–that the ISI supports Taliban insurgents fighting U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan–may not be new, they exacerbated strains in U.S.-Pakistan relations.
    You can put out your hand & feel that hatred!

  • Wajahat  On October 17, 2010 at 12:51 pm

    Comprehesive.
    Enjoyed reading it.

    • Abdullah Gul  On October 19, 2010 at 7:23 am

      Thank you very much for your kind remark.

      Abdullah Gul
      Chairman Mohsinan-i-Pakistan Foundation
      Chairman National Youth Conference

  • Laila  On October 17, 2010 at 12:59 pm

    The revelation of the 92,000 Afghanistan war logs sparked a day of drama in London and Washington, as governments and the media scrambled to make sense of the raw data and judge what impact it would have on the conduct of the war against the Taliban, relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the effect on the public mood in the countries that provide the coalition forces, especially the US, Britain and Germany.
    The documents have been published by the whistleblowing website Wikileaks and made available to the Guardian, the New York Times and the German news magazine Der Spiegel.

    All three news organisations have stressed that they have vetted the files and removed any materials which threatens the safety of troops.

    Each of the news organisations has a slightly different take on the files.
    A White House briefing on the leaks is also published in full by the New York Times.

    It says:

    1) I don’t think anyone who follows this issue will find it surprising that there are concerns about ISI and safe havens in Pakistan. In fact, we’ve said as much repeatedly and on the record. Attached please find a document with some relevant quotes from senior USG officials.

    2) The period of time covered in these documents (January 2004-December 2009) is before the President announced his new strategy. Some of the disconcerting things reported are exactly why the President ordered a three month policy review and a change in strategy.

    3) Note the interesting graphs (pasted below) from the Guardian’s wikileaks story. I think they help put these documents in context.

    4) As you report on this issue, it’s worth noting that wikileaks is not an objective news outlet but rather an organization that opposes US policy in Afghanistan.
    If you want to know why these Afghanistan war logs are an important and, in some cases, devastating account, have a look at this excellent analysis of some of the records by Declan Walsh, into how US marines sanitised their account of a blooody rampage in which 19 civilians were killed:

    It started with a suicide bomb. On 4 March 2007 a convoy of US marines, who arrived in Afghanistan three weeks earlier, were hit by an explosives-rigged minivan outside the city of Jalalabad.
    The marines made a frenzied escape, opening fire with automatic weapons as they tore down a six-mile stretch of highway, hitting almost anyone in their way – teenage girls in fields, motorists in their cars, old men as they walked along the road. Nineteen unarmed civilians were killed and 50 wounded.

    None of this, however, was captured in the initial military account, written by the marines themselves. It simply says that, simultaneous to the suicide explosion, “the patrol received small arms fire from three directions”.

  • Salman Abbasy  On October 17, 2010 at 3:17 pm

    Both Abdullah Gul and Dr Shireen Mazari are on target. Abdullah Gul has got the crux of the problem when he writes: “Pakistan has been held to the course by the US promoting a dictator, and then imposing a truncated democracy through an externally-brokered deal called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO).” Twisting the deviant democracy’s arm got a three-year extention for General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani and a generous increase in the military budget at a time of financial strain. Dr Shireen Mazari has got the right remedy but her advice is likely to go unheeded in the existing circumstances.

  • Bajwa  On October 18, 2010 at 1:00 am

    The fact remains that both Pakistan and US policies on Afghanistan have been kept under the table. Such an approach is always distasterous. According to Altaf Gauhar all decisions relating to 1965 were taken by Ayube,Moosa, Bhuttoo and Aziz Ahmed and they were generally divided. Mlitary men on one side and FO guys on the other. Difference are good but should be shared and should be transparent.Afghan affairs have be handled by all, including Mullah Omer,with total disregard to the welfare of poor Afghans and history will never forgive these leaders. This region has never seen so much bloodshed.

  • Brig Latif  On October 18, 2010 at 1:01 am

    A good article. Correct analysis.
    Paragraph ‘Between Policy and Posture’ is the crux of the analysis relating to Pakistan.

    • Abdullah Gul  On October 19, 2010 at 7:26 am

      Thank you for appreciating my article/report.

      Abdullah Gul
      Chairman Mohsinan-i-Pakistan Foundation
      Chairman National Youth Conference

  • Paul Wolf  On October 18, 2010 at 3:16 am

    It’s an issue of fundamental fairness to General Gul that he knows who are the people making these accusations against him. Wikileaks will give this scandalous material to the press, to use to blast General Gul, but they won’t give it to him, so he would have the opportunity to know the details of the accusations and properly respond to them.

    This wikileaks guy is running around telling everyone the Pentagon is trying to capture him. He’s got the news media believing he sleeps in a different bed every night. Then he sleeps with two female admirers in Sweden and ditches them, they get mad at him and accuse him of rape. Then the women become part of a Pentagon plot, it was all a set-up. Then to keep the media frenzy going he publishes a few other meaningless documents people sent to him in the week after he got all that press.

    Conclusion: the guy is an amateur and not a particularly credible source himself.

    • pakpotpourri2  On October 18, 2010 at 1:05 pm

      Thank you dear Paul for your comment.Excellent discourse,as usual if I may add.

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